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ABSTRACT
Supply chain collaboration creates a gain (a surplus) compared to uncoordinated
or disconnected supply chain policies. In this paper we review policies to allo-
cate the “gain” to supply chain members so that each firm’s objective becomes
aligned with the supply chain’s objective. In other words we examine conditions
for a successful implementation of “altruistic” behavior (that means a policy that
is not optimal for itself, but optimal for global performance). Several policies are
examined, such as alignment of replenishment rules, vendor managed inventory,
buyback contracts, revenue sharing contracts and quantity discount contracts.
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Supply chains can be viewed as networks or consortia of firms that are
pooling their capabilities and resources. These industry or service net-
works consist of focused specialists. It is clear that in such an envi-
ronment there is an increased need for supply chain coordination.
Modern supply chain management starts with the premise that supply
chain members are primarily concerned with optimizing their own
objectives and that self-serving focus often results in poor perfor-
mance, or a sequence of locally optimal policies does not bring a glob-
ally optimal solution (Cachon 2003). Munson et al. (2003) summarize
it as follows “When each member of a group tries to maximize his or
her own benefit without regard to the impact on other members of the
group, the overall effectiveness may suffer. Such inefficiencies often
creep in when rational members of supply chains optimize individu-
ally instead of coordinating their efforts”.
This premise does have a number of important consequences. One
of them is that at least one player in a supply chain network should
display altruistic behavior, that means, pursuing a policy that is not
optimal for itself, but optimal for the global performance. This
explains the title of this review article. How can somebody achieve that
each firm’s objective becomes aligned with the supply chain’s objec-
tive? We must also make sure that the supply chain actions should be
a unique Nash equilibrium, we should not coordinate on a suboptimal
set of actions and no firm should have a profitable unilateral devia-
tion from the optimal global supply chain actions.
The success of the altruistic behavior depends on what is done with
the supply chain gain. The supply chain gain can be defined as the dif-
ference in profit between a coordinated and an uncoordinated supply
chain policy. Coordination creates a surplus, a supply chain gain as it
is called. This gain has to be allocated to the individual members of
the network. This allocation can take the form of a transfer payment
that ensures that each firm’s objective becomes aligned with the sup-
ply chain’s objective. That is the key idea of this paper.
This paper is organized as follows. In section II, we review several
supply chain gain allocation policies such as: buyback contracts, rev-
enue-sharing contracts, quantity flexibility contracts, sales rebate con-
tracts and quantity discounts contracts. In section III, we suggest a
method to improve supply chain performance by coordinating, or
aligning, the parameters of replenishment rules used in supply chain
500
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icy, namely, Vendor Managed Inventory (VMI) will be discussed. Sec-
tion IV draws some conclusios.
II. SUPPLY CHAIN CONTRACTING
As was mentioned in the introduction, supply chain coordination may
create a surplus or a gain. That means that companies are better of
when they act as a group instead of individually. If a supplier and a
retailer work together (through information sharing, collaborative fore-
casting, joint replenishment, etc.) suppliers may realize economies of
scale in the production and the distribution process. In return, retail-
ers may transfer inventory carrying costs to the supplier. The capital
cost of carrying inventory is transferred simply by having the retailer
pay the supplier only when the items are sold. Bernstein et al. (2006)
report on the Wal-Mart policy where they want their vendors to cap-
ture the Point-Of-Sales transaction which says: it’s been bought, so
now you can bill Wal-Mart. Even physical warehousing costs are
sometimes transferred by suppliers or their third-party logistics
providers owning or renting warehouse space in the proximity of the
retailers. These partnerships often require major investments in infor-
mation sharing technology. This example illustrates the need to
develop a theory of the economics of supply chain integration.
Recently researchers started to model these contracting issues. The
objective of this section is to review a number of these models.
A. The Newsvendor Problem
Throughout the text, we will use a simple supply chain structure based
on Tsay et al. (1999). Consider a supply chain with two echelons, a
retailer and a manufacturer (see Figure 1). The manufacturer produces
the product at a constant unit cost, c, and charges the retailer a unit
manufacturer transfer price denoted by cm. The retailer sells the prod-
uct at a price of p per unit. Market demand denoted by D(p) is price
sensitive and uncertain. Unsold products still have a certain value,
called salvage value v. The retailer’s order quantity is denoted by Q.
This problem is usually studied in a so-called newsvendor setting.
A newsvendor problem is a one-period problem in which the retailer
(buyer) must make a single bet (that means determining the order
501
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products, short life cycle products,…). There are costs if the bet turns
out to be too high (overstocking cost). There are costs if the bet turns
out to be too low (understocking cost). The newsvendor model’s objec-
tive is to bet an amount that correctly balances those opposing forces.
It is clear that the manufacturer is bounded by the decision made by
the retailer. This setting introduces some simplifying assumptions, but
it still captures a real world situation and it makes the analysis more
tractable.
The above situation can now be analyzed with a decentralized con-
trol structure (the retailer and manufacturer determine the optimal
decisions independently) or with a coordination control structure (e.g.
a risk-sharing arrangement or assuming that all decisions are made by
a single decision maker). The difference between the expected profits
under both scenarios is called the supply chain gain. The allocation of




Two echelon supply chain structure (based on Tsay et al. 1999)
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depends on the optimal balance of the overstocking and understock-
ing cost. The overstocking cost equals Cov∞∞=∞∞(cm∞∞–∞∞v) and the under-
stocking cost equals Cun∞∞=∞∞(p∞∞–∞∞cm). It can be shown that the economic
stockout probability Pr∞∞(D∞∞≥∞∞Q) is determined by:
(1)
Once the order quantity Q is determined by the retailer by using (1),
the manufacturer is assumed to correctly anticipate how the retailer
will order. The manufacturer is bounded by the decision of the retailer
and the manufacturer’s profit is deterministic. It is interesting to note
that all uncertainty regarding channel profits is foisted onto the retailer.
We will now look for mechanisms that the supply chain parties can
use to improve profits (and consequently create a supply chain gain).
One possibility is to offer a buy-back contract. In such a contract, the
manufacturer agrees to buy back unsold goods from the retailer for
some agreed-upon price. If the buyback price, b, is larger than the sal-
vage value, then the overstocking cost will decrease. This will result
in an increase of the order quantity of the retailer. The buy-back con-
tract is effective because it allows the manufacturer to share some of
the risk with the retailer and thus motivates the retailer to increase the
order quantity. With a buy-back contract the manufacturer is now
exposed to the possibility of a poor (unfavorable) demand outcome.
A buy-back contract is an example of a coordinating contract. There
are many other coordinating contracts, e.g. a revenue-sharing contract.
In a revenue-sharing contract, the retailer shares some of the revenue
with the manufacturer in return for a discount on the transfer price cm.
Note that a coordinating contract is not unique. Contracts differ in
how they divide the additional channel profit among the players.
Quantity flexibility contract is another coordination scheme. In a
quantity flexibility contract, the manufacturer provides an “upside”
coverage to the retailer of u∞∞% above the initial order. In return, the
retailer accepts a “downside” commitment of d∞∞%. The retailer com-
mits him/herself to a minimum purchase requirement. The retailer is
allowed to cancel d % of the order but must take the remainder.
Another common type of coordinating scheme are quantity dis-
counts. Quantity discounts encourage buyers to order additional inven-
tory because the purchase price of the last unit purchased is decreasing
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consequently increases the understocking cost) (see section B).
It is amazing to observe that the one period newsvendor problem
offers the methodological basis to study various types of coordinating
contracts. The newsvendor parameters are different for each type of
coordinating contract. These parameter values determine the critical
ratio or economic stock-out probability. And this in turn determines the
order quantity.
B. Quantity and volume discounts
In an environment where the price is set by the market, manufac-
turers can use lot size based quantity discounts to achieve coordina-
tion in the supply chain and for products where the firm has market
power, volume based quantity discounts can be used to achieve coor-
dination and to maximize supply chain profits (Chopra and Meindl,
2007).
Let’s first discuss the issue of lot size based quantity discounts. This
type of coordinating scheme is common practice in industry and retail-
ing. A manufacturer (supplier) reduces the unit price if the buyer
(retailer) buys more than a certain number of units in one lot. How can
such a policy coordinate decisions made by supply chain partners?
Assume that a retailer wants to order in batch sizes of Qr units. The
manufacturer however prefers, based on his production economics, to
produce in batches of Qm units. Here we clearly have a conflict. It may
therefore be advisable to find a batch size which is minimizing total
ordering and inventory costs for both parties simultaneously. This so-
called coordinated economic order quantity Qco can easily be com-
puted (see e.g. Lambrecht 2006). Many scenarios are possible, but
assume that:
Qr∞∞≤∞∞Qco∞∞≤∞∞Qm (2)
Imposing Qco on both supply chain partners is clearly disadvanta-
geous for the retailer. The manufacturer however experiences a gain
(the coordinated lot size is closer to his preferred batch size), let’s
denote the gain by Dcoordinated. Let’s denote the extra supply chain cost
for the retailer by Qretailer. The retailer will only be willing to
give up his preferred lot size if his loss Qretailer is compensated by
the manufacturer. Part of Dcoordinated can now be used as a “transfer”
504
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ment can take on the form of a quantity discount. The discount will
be offered for lot sizes of Qco. In this way, the decisions of both sup-
ply chain members will be aligned and the supply chain gain will be
realized.
Let’s now turn to the situation where the retailer has market power.
We now assume a demand curve D(p). The fundamental decision is
to determine p (retailer price). The existence of two entities (retailer
and manufacturer) in the supply chain can lead to double marginal-
ization. Double marginalization refers to the notion where each sup-
ply chain member sets its price independently. The manufacturer fixes
a transfer price cm for the retailer and in turn the retailer determines
a selling price p. Double marginalization is a well-known cause of
supply chain inefficiency, it leads to a loss in profit because each
stage makes its decision considering only its local margin (Chopra
and Meindl, 2007). It is possible to find a unique retailer price pco,
a globally optimal, coordinated price which will maximize the over-
all supply chain profit. This price usually results in a higher sales
volume. In order to align the decisions of the supply chain partners,
it may be required to allocate the supply chain gain. This can be
achieved by offering a volume-based quantity discount (and conse-
quently lowering cm) to the retailer. The above reasoning holds under
the assumption that customer demand increases when the retailer
decreases the price.
All of the examples discussed in this section deal with vertical coor-
dination. This results in contracts between upstream and downstream
members of the same supply chain. What is common to all of these
agreements? Two elements are crucial, one, the risk sharing motive
and two, the necessary condition that all parties ultimately benefit.
There are of course a large number of other coordinating mechanisms
for firms e.g. belonging to different supply chains. This is usually
referred to as horizontal coordination. Think of spare part manage-
ment agreements between airline companies, the exploitation of com-
mon warehouse facilities, optimization of (multi-modal) transporta-
tion, etc. The main purpose of these horizontal coordination
mechanisms is to improve efficiency through the exploitation of
economies of scale. In this article, we do not further discuss horizon-
tal coordination, instead we will focus in the next section on the cre-
ation of a transparent, visible demand pattern that paces the (entire)
supply chain through the alignment of replenishment rules.
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A. A win-win solution for the bullwhip problem
Lack of coordination in supply chains may lead to serious supply chain
problems. One of these problems is the bullwhip effect. This effect
refers to the tendency of replenishment orders to increase in variabil-
ity as one moves up the supply chain from retailer to manufacturer.
Procter and Gamble used this terminology to describe the ordering
behavior witnessed between customers and suppliers of Pampers dia-
pers. While diapers enjoy a fairly constant consumption rate, P&G
found that wholesale orders tended to fluctuate considerably over time.
They observed further amplification of the oscillations of orders
placed to their suppliers of raw material. This distorted information
throughout the supply chain can lead to tremendous inefficiencies;
excessive inventory investment, poor customer service, lost revenues,
misguided capacity plans, ineffective transportation, and missed pro-
duction schedules (Lee et al. 1997).
It has been recognized that the ordering policy used by the mem-
bers of the chain is one of the key causes of the bullwhip effect
(Dejonckheere et al. 2003). In other words, when supply chain mem-
bers are primarily focussed on optimizing their own inventory policy,
the bullwhip effect may occur, resulting in significant cost implications
for the supply chain partners, and as such, leading to a poor overall
supply chain performance. Therefore, in order to achieve the global
supply chain’s objective, taming the bullwhip seems to be a dominat-
ing strategy. This can be done by aliging the replenishment policy with
the supply chain partners. The upstream manufacturer aims to smooth
production and therefore he prefers minimal variability in the replen-
ishment orders from the (downstream) retailer. The manufacturer not
only prefers a level production schedule, the smoothed demand also
allows him to minimize his raw materials inventory cost. Balakrish-
nan et al. (2004) emphasize the opportunities to reduce supply chain
costs by dampening order variability.
This has led to the creation of new replenishment rules that are able
to generate smooth order patterns (e.g. Dejonckheere et al. 2003,
Balakrishnan et al. 2004). This implies that supply chain members dis-
play altruistic behavior by reducing the variability in their replenish-
ment orders to serve the global performance. However, the upstream
echelons do benefit from smooth replenishments, but the downstream
506
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tory variance increases. Disney et al. (2006) quantify the variance of the
net stock and compute the required safety stock as a function of the
smoothing intensity. Their main conclusion is that when customer
demand is i.i.d.(independently and identically distributed), order
smoothing comes at a price. In order to guarantee the same fill rate,
more investment in safety stock is required (see also Disney et al. 2005).
Let us focus on a replenishment rule that is able to smooth the order
pattern. Given the common practice in retailing to replenish invento-
ries frequently (e.g. daily) and the tendency of manufacturers to pro-
duce to demand, we focus on periodic review, base-stock or order-up-
to replenishment policies. The standard periodic review base-stock
replenishment policy is the (R,S) replenishment policy. At the end of
every review period R, the retailer tracks his inventory position IPt,
which is the sum of the inventory on hand (items immediately avail-
able to meet demand) and the inventory on order (items ordered but
not yet arrived due to the lead time) minus the backlog (demand that
could not be fulfilled and still has to be delivered). A replenishment
order is then placed to raise the inventory position to an order-up-to
or base-stock level S, which determines the order quantity Ot:
Ot∞∞=∞∞S∞∞–∞∞IPt. (3)
A smoothing replenishment policy is a policy where the decision
maker does not recover the entire deficit between the base-stock level
and the inventory position in one time period (contrary to what hap-
pens in Eqn. (3)). Forrester (1961) proposes to order only a fraction b
of the inventory deficit, resulting in the following ordering policy:
Ot∞∞=∞∞b∞∞·∞∞(S∞∞–∞∞IPt). (4)
Forrester (1961) refers to 1∞/∞b as the ‘adjustment time’ and hence
explicitly acknowledges that the deficit recovery should be spread out
over time. Under a fixed lead time assumption such a smoothing pol-
icy is justified when production (or ordering) and holding costs are
convex or when there is a cost of changing the level of production.
When lead times are considered to be endogenously determined, this
replenishment rule smoothes the manufacturer’s production, resulting
in shorter order-to-delivery times and more balanced production
schedules.
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we look at the ratio of the variance of the orders over the variance of
demand (in the literature this variance ratio is commonly used as a
measure for the bullwhip effect), which is in this case given by
(5)
Hence, if we do not smooth, i.e. if b∞∞=∞∞1, these expressions reduce
to the standard base-stock policy, where Ot∞∞=∞∞Dt; we chase sales and
thus there is no variance amplification. For 1∞∞<∞∞b∞∞<∞∞2 we create bull-
whip (variance amplification) and for 0∞∞<∞∞b∞∞<∞∞1 we generate a smooth
replenishment pattern (dampening order variability).
So far, we have been concentrating on the variance of orders placed.
This is, however, only one side of the coin. We should also study the
variance of inventory, because that variance will have an immediate
effect on customer service: the higher the variance, the more stock
will be needed to maintain customer service at the target level. We
therefore measure the net stock amplification (NSAmp), which equals
the ratio of the inventory variance over the demand variance. Net stock
variance (let alone variance amplification) is not a common supply
chain measure, but we need it to calculate the fill rate, which is a pop-
ular customer service measure. For the replenishment rule described
by Eqn. (4), Disney et al. (2006) show that when demand is i.i.d., the
net stock amplification is given by the following expression:
(6)
where Tp denotes the physical replenishment lead time. Eqn. (6)
indeed indicates that both smooth ordering patterns and bullwhip result
in higher inventory fluctuations compared to the standard order-up-to
policy, and consequently they provide a poorer fill rate. In other words,
we are able to smooth the order pattern, but pay the price of higher
inventory fluctuations and more inventory costs.
This has an important consequence. Manufacturers do benefit from
smooth production, but retailers, driven by the goal of reducing inven-
tory (holding and shortage/backlog) costs, prefer to use replenishment
policies that chase demand rather than dampen consumer demand vari-
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not be reached.
This conflicting issue can be resolved by coordinating the supply
chain. Boute (2006) models a two echelon supply chain as a produc-
tion-inventory system, as illustrated in Figure 2. This implies that a
replenishment order generated by the retailer’s inventory results in an
arrival of a production order at the manufacturer. Hence the choice of
the retailer’s replenishment policy (amplifying or dampening customer
demand variability in the replenishment orders) determines the arrival
process of production orders at the manufacturer’s production queue
and as such it affects the distribution of the lead times.
In this model, Boute (2006) demonstrates that a smooth order pat-
tern generates shorter and less variable (production/replenishment)
lead times, introducing a compensating effect on the inventory levels.
This results in a win-win solution for all supply chain partners: smooth
production upstream the chain and lower inventory levels downstream
the supply chain. Hence, the buy-back contract discussed in the pre-
vious section takes in this case the form of a reduced delivery lead
time.
B. Supply chain coordination through Vendor Managed Inventories
(VMI)
In a traditional supply chain, each level in the supply chain issues pro-
duction orders and replenishes stock without considering the situation
at either up- or downstream tiers of the supply chain. This is how most
509
FIGURE 2
A two echelon supply chain model as a production/inventory system
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and the supplier. However, when supply chain members act like inde-
pendent entities with individual goals, even if each of them behaves
rationally, the entire chain would only be able to achieve a local opti-
mum or a myopic profitability. In order to achieve the global supply
chain optimum, collaboration can be installed through a wide range of
concepts such as Collaborative Forecasting Planning and Replenish-
ment (CPFR), Information Sharing and Vendor Managed Inventory
(VMI, including Continuous Replenishment). A more drastic solution
can be obtained by a redesign of the supply chain by eliminating ech-
elons. One of the commonly used strategies for achieving supply chain
coordination is the Vendor Managed Inventory method. In this sec-
tion we discuss why the VMI model may be favorable over the tradi-
tional supply chain structure.
VMI eliminates one decision point and merges the replenishment
decision with the production and materials planning of the supplier.
Here, the supplier takes charge of the customer’s inventory replenish-
ment on the operational level, and uses this visibility in planning his
own supply operations (e.g. more efficient production schedules and
transportation planning). With VMI, multi-echelon supply chains can
act in the same way, dynamically, as a single echelon of a supply chain.
This allows the supplier to proactively plan his production and ship-
ments to the customer, instead of reacting to the customer’s orders.
Additionally, the supplier has a much better market knowledge about
his products than the retailer. Therefore he is in a better position for
forecasting and inventory control purposes, resulting in improved
inventory performance and customer service levels at every stage of
the supply chain. VMI often results in more frequent replenishments
and consequently the order quantity variance is reduced. Economies
in transportation can also be obtained through an optimization of the
route planning and with methods such as joint replenishment and
inventory routing techniques. The VMI model is in other words a chan-
nel coordination strategy between downstream and upstream players.
Based on their common interests and objectives, the two players reach
an agreement that the upstream member will manage the downstream
member’s inventory stock decisions and that both will monitor and
modify their agreed terms.
We briefly illustrate the benefits of VMI with a real life example.
We analyze the ordering pattern of a bakery company focusing
on authentic specialties in the biscuit and cake world: caramelized
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certain products, a make-to-order policy is employed and the assump-
tions used in this paper are largely satisfied. In 2002, the firm intro-
duced a VMI program implemented in the SAP software, referred to
as “Customer Replenishment Planning” (CRP). In Figure 3 we show
a graph of the shipments from the production facility to the distribu-
tion centre of a retailer (for one specific product) in the pre-CRP
period (2001-mid 2002) and the shipments in the post-CRP period
(mid 2002-2005). The coefficient of variation of the shipment quan-
tities went down from 1.14 to 0.45 (a number observed for other prod-
ucts as well). We were also able to collect (post-CRP) data on the ship-
ments from the distribution centre of the retailer to the different retail
outlets. For the specific product discussed above, we obtain a coeffi-
cient of variation of 0.40.
The company now benefits from a higher flexibility in its produc-
tion planning, since the CRP program allows to plan proactively
instead of reactively. It is also able to utilize the production facilities
more efficiently, as the outputs need not be ramped up and down based
on large swings in orders. It reduced its transportation costs consid-
erably due to an improved and more stable transport planning. More-
over, inventories decreased both at the manufacturer and at the retailer,
511
FIGURE 3
The impact of VMI on the order variability
0332-07_TEM_07-3_10_Boute  12-10-2007  09:14  Pagina 511improving the freshness of the products of the end consumer. Finally,
the customer service level improved as product availability increased,
thereby increasing the profitability for both the manufacture and the
retailer.
IV . CONCLUSION
Altruistic behavior refers to the act of self-sacrifice for the benefit of
others. In this article we didn’t refer to the ethical interpretation, but
simply to the idea that in supply chains the optimal global perfor-
mance is not obtained by optimal behavior of the individual players.
Or stated more simply, inefficiencies creep in when rational members
of supply chains optimize individually instead of coordinating their
efforts. We show that coordination creates a supply chain gain. This
gain has to be allocated to the players so that each firm’s objective
becomes aligned with the supply chain’s objective. Self-sacrifice is in
other words not what happens. Instead, the altruistic behavior has to
be compensated by buy-back contracts, revenue-sharing contracts,
quantity flexibility contracts, sales rebate contracts, shorter lead-times,
information sharing, collaborative forecasting or vendor managed
inventories. In this article we discuss and summarize the most impor-
tant supply chain coordination mechanisms.
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